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BEGGED, BORROWED OR STOLEN:
WHOSE ART IS IT, ANYWAY?
AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION OF FINE ART LICENSING
by JUDITH BRESLER, Eso.*
INTRODUCTION
In 1999, Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
delivered a Brace Memorial Lecture' which posed a provocative proposi-
tion: featuring the Ninth Circuit case of Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin
Books2 (discussed later) as the centerpiece of his talk, Judge Kozinski pro-
posed that the Copyright Act be revised to permit infringing derivative
works to enter - and presumably enhance - the intellectual market-
place. Hand in hand with this permissiveness and in the interests of fair
play, Judge Kozinski also suggested that the author of the original work,
which by virtue of spawning derivative works creates value, be paid by the
creator of the derivative work, infringing profits attributable to the in-
fringement, along with any actual damages "suffered as a result of the
infringement."3
The remedies of injunction and impoundment (§§ 502 and 503, re-
spectively, of the Copyright Act) would not be available under Judge
Kozinski's proposal unless "there is strong reason to believe that damages
will be inadequate."4 In his Lecture, the Judge goes on to suggest that
either party - the copyright holder or prospective derivative user - can
offer to enter into a license with the other, and that any offeree who ref-
uses will have to bear the costs and attorney's fees of any subsequent in-
*@ by Judith Bresler, 2003. All rights reserved. Judith Bresler, a partner with the
law firm of Cowan, DeBaets, Abrahams and Sheppard LLP, specializes in all as-
pects of art law. She is also co-author, along with Ralph E. Lerner, of the award-
winning treatise, ART LAW: The Guide for Collectors, Investors, Dealers and Art-
ists (1st and 2d eds.)
1 Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What's So Fair About Fair Use?, 46 J.
COPYR. Soc'y 513 (1999) (The 1999 Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture
given at Fordham University School of Law, November 11, 1999. Delivered
by Judge Alex Kozinski, and co-authored by Christopher Newman, J.D.
University of Michigan, 1999).
2 Dr. Seuss Enters, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.
1997), petition for cert. dismissed, 521 U.S. 1146 (1997).
3 Kozinski & Newman, supra note 1, at 526. The authors did exclude from dam-
ages "those damages attributable to critical evaluation of the copyrighted
work." Id.
4 Id. at 525.
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fringement trial that fails to award the offeree terms more favorable than
that offered by the original license.5
The central concept of Judge Kozinski's proposal-eliminating the
copyright owner's right to control the uses to which her published work is
put while fortifying her right to compensation for value created-while
admirable in some respects is nevertheless troubling. For one, eliminating
in toto a copyright owner's right to control the use to which her published
work is put, seems too radical an abridgement of the intellectual property
rights of the creator, whatever the benefit to the intellectual marketplace.
For another, Judge Kozinski's proposal does not do away with the burden-
some and costly process of copyright litigation. To illustrate with Judge
Kozinski's own example: if Seuss Enterprises offered to grant a license to
Penguin Books for the work in question, The Cat NOT in the Hat! by Dr.
Juice, and Penguin refused to pay, Seuss Enterprises may sue Penguin for
copyright infringement and Penguin would have to pay court costs and
attorneys fees in the event the court found the work to be infringing and
Seuss's offer reasonable.6 That being said, certain elements of Judge
Kozinski's proposal are rooted in the ideas presented in this paper, and
seem to speak with particular resonance to the copyright-based products
of fine art.
The visual artist does not create in a void: generally, her point of de-
parture is an earlier image, whether that image, for example, is an oil
painting in the public domain, a political cartoon under copyright protec-
tion, or an image of a natural setting once seen by the artist and now resid-
ing in the artist's memory. The earlier image, expressed by means of the
artist's particular stylistic vocabulary and filtered through the artist's
unique set of perceptions, is now transformed into a new image which, in
turn, will serve as a point of departure for future images.7
I. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF ARTISTIC BORROWINGS
The use of an artist's work by another artist to create a subsequent
work, has abounded through the ages. Consider, for example, the French
artist Edouard Manet's famous Impressionist painting Luncheon on the
Grass, first exhibited in the 1860s, portraying two fully clothed gentlemen
and a nude woman seated in a sylvan clearing enjoying a picnic lunch. The
painting was derived from a depiction of classical deities in a Raphael-like
engraving made centuries earlier, and those figures, just as derivative,
5 Id. at 526.
6 Id. at 527.
7 For an illuminating discussion about artistic tradition and appropriation, see
Introduction, in HORST WOLDEMAR JANSON, HISTORY OF ART (5th ed.
1995).
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stemmed from sources dating from ancient Roman art.8 As another ex-
ample, consider the famous oil-on-canvas painting done in 1851 by the
American artist Emanuel Leutze and based on an incident in American
history: Washington Crossing the Delaware. Approximately one hundred
years later - 1953 - the late American artist Larry Rivers created a
painting similarly entitled Washington Crossing the Delaware which dif-
fered both compositionally and stylistically from Leutze's image.9 In 1956,
the playwright Kenneth Koch wrote a one-act play derived from Larry
Rivers' painting. When the play was performed six years later at the
Maidman Theatre in New York City, it featured a stage set created in 1961
by set designer Alex Katz. In his tableau, Katz reversed the direction of
the crossing from that in Leutze's image to represent movement from
Pennsylvania to New Jersey more accurately.' 0 As Katz's stage set was
created around the time that the movement of Pop Art was emerging in
the United States, his tableau, using a vocabulary consistent with that of
numerous works of the genre, incorporated alongside the painted forms a
number of real objects: a china tea pot and two cups and saucers." The
decade of the 1970s, which included the celebration of the United States
Bicentennial, brought still another wave of Delaware images. Now,
Leutze's iconic work provided the springboard for the artist Peter Saul's
highly expressive painting of 1975: George Washington Crossing the Dela-
ware. This Delaware packs a visual wallop of day-glo colors and distorted,
rubbery figures, transforming the Leutze image into a frenetic depiction of
mayhem.' 2 That same year, Leutze's image also served as a point of de-
parture for the artist Robert Colescott: his unsettling work, entitled
George Washington Carver Crossing the Delaware: Page from an American
History Textbook,13 depicts not George Washington but rather, a benign,
bespectacled, Carver, along with other Afro-American figures portraying,
in exaggerated fashion, such stereotypical roles as the nanny, cook and
banjo player. His satirical image was a particularly keen comment on ra-
cial attitudes in the United States during the time of Carver.
Image appropriation flourished throughout the twentieth century.
The early 1900s witnessed a burgeoning of popular culture that was dis-
seminated to the public by such media as photography, advertising, maga-
zine illustrations, and comic strips. The growth in popular culture amid the
backdrop of despair over the hitherto unsurpassed mechanized killings of
8 Id.
9 GEORGE WASHINGTON: AMERICAN SYMBOL 145 (Barbara J. Mitnick ed.,
1999).
10 Id. at 146
11 Id.
12 Id. at 147
13 Id.
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World War I produced the short-lived philosophical movement of Dada-
ism. A declared purpose of Dadaism was to demonstrate that all moral
and aesthetic values had been rendered meaningless by the Great War.14
Dada art, brought to the United States in 1915 by the French artist Marcel
Duchamp, preached a type of anti-art exemplified by Duchamp's "im-
proved" reproduction of Leonardo da Vinci's Mona Lisa, complete with
moustache, goatee, and a caption that amounted to a tasteless French pun:
LHOOQ.15 Another example of Duchamp's "borrowing" is the photo-
collage Monte Carlo Bond. Duchamp established a roulette society and
sold bonds to finance his playing. The face of the bond uses a Man Ray
photograph of Duchamp with a lathered head, his hair sculpted into the
winged head of Mercury, Roman god of commerce and patron of
thieves.' 6
Dadaism was the patron saint of Pop Art, which developed in En-
gland in the mid-1950s and emerged in the United States in the early
1960s.17 Pop artists were generally not satirical: essentially, such artists ex-
amined and depicted the objects and images of their world with an inten-
sity designed to make the viewer uniquely conscious of the reality of such
objects and images. To that end, Pop Art, even more than Dadaism, relied
on images disseminated by the mass media,' 8 including the cinema, visual
art, and such mundane items as kitchen appliances and household goods.
Famous examples of Pop Art are the comic-strip paintings with benday
dots by Roy Lichtenstein and Andy Warhol's repetitive depictions on can-
vas of Campbell's soup cans.
The post-modernist art movement, which emerged in the 1980s, is
rooted in Dadaism and Pop Art. Many artists who achieved particular
prominence in the 1980s share a postmodernist belief that Western socie-
ties foster image-saturated cultures that promote deterioration in the qual-
ity of life. Such artists frequently express that observation by plucking
preexisting images from the mass media, high art, pulp romances, and
mass culture and recontextualizing those images in their own work, often
by the use of photography, video, and other reproductive techniques. The
boldness of these borrowings, coupled with the pervasive use of reproduc-
tive techniques gave rise to the term "appropriation art." 19 The artist Bar-
bara Kruger is a postmodernist. Typically, in much of her work, she
appropriates a black and white photograph from a magazine or a newspa-
14 JANSON, supra note 7, at 528.
15 Roughly translated, the pun is "she has a hot ass."
16 JANIS MINK TASCHEN, MARCEL DUCHAMP 73 (2000).
17 H. HARVARD ARNASON, HISTORY OF MODERN ART/PAINTING SCULPTURE
ARCHITECTURE PHOTOGRAPHY 448 (3d ed. 1986).
18 JANSON, supra note 7, at 547.
19 ARNASON, supra note 17, at 636.
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per, carefully crops the desired image, blows it up to such monumental
proportions that the viewer cannot escape, and then juxtaposes as a cap-
tion a bit of unrelated feminist text.20 One highly publicized example of
her work, Untitled (Your gaze hits the side of my face) depicts a close-up of
a female image in profile, with the caption juxtaposed in vertical fashion
and the unmistakable implication that a (male) stare directed at the sub-
ject is violative. In another well-known piece, Untitled (Your body is a
battleground) the image is a close-up frontal view of a female face, bi-
sected so that the left side of the image is in normal black and white, and
the right side of the image appears as a black-and-white negative. The
resulting image is a female face ravaged by all manner of (sexist) tensions.
IL ARTISTIC BORROWINGS AS ADDRESSED BY COPYRIGHT
LAW
The tradition of image appropriation must be examined in the context
of copyright law. Under current United States law, a copyright proprietor
of a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work can generally assert the following
exclusive rights: to reproduce, adapt, distribute and publicly display such a
work.21 The post-modernist Jeff Koons, in appropriating a photograph by
a professional photographer for use as the basis of the creation of a lim-
ited-edition sculpture, was found liable for copyright infringement in the
famous Second Circuit case of Rogers v. Koons,22 an early 1990s case that
transfixed both the art world and the copyright legal community. The case
involved a lawsuit by Art Rogers, a professional photographer, whose
photograph Puppies (depicting a couple seated on a bench and holding
their new litter of eight German Shepherd puppies) was the basis of a
sculpture subsequently created by Koons in an edition of three entitled
String of Puppies. The sculpture was exhibited by the Sonnabend Gallery
in New York City, and the edition sold for a total of $367,000. The finding
of copyright infringement by the Second Circuit, affirming a New York
federal district court decision,23 included, along with a cogent analysis of
the then-current matrix of factors comprising the defense of fair use, a
condemnatory speculation about Koons's motives in committing the
infringement:
20 WHITNEY CHADWICK, WOMEN, ART AND SOCIETY 385 (2d ed. 1997).
21 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). A "work of visual art" as defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101
includes some but not all "pictorial, graphic and sculptural works" as also
defined in 17 U.S.C. §101. The author of a work of visual art, whether or
not s/he remains the copyright proprietor of such a work, may exercise the
rights of paternity and integrity, as defined in 17 U.S.C. § 106A in and to
that work.
22 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 934 (1992).
23 Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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The key to this copyright infringement suit ... is [Koons's] bor-
rowing of plaintiff's expression of a typical American scene....
The copying was so deliberate as to suggest that [Koons] re-
solved so long as he [was a] significant [player] in the art busi-
ness, and the copies [he] produced bettered the price of the
copied work by a thousand to one, [his] piracy of a less well-
known artist's work would escape being sullied by an accusation
of plagiarism. 24
The Rogers v. Koons decision was controversial for a number of reasons:
for one, its analysis of the fair use factors ignored in toto the artistic pro-
cess of creation and the historical tradition of image appropriation. A sec-
ond reason the decision was controversial was that the Second Circuit did
not recognize Koons's sculpture as being a parody of Rogers's photograph.
Although parody had been recognized in the Second Circuit, as well as in
other United States circuit courtS25 as a form of comment or criticism ca-
pable of passing muster under the fair-use defense in an infringement suit,
the Supreme Court did not address the issue directly until the 1994 water-
shed case of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.26 Here, in holding that a
popular rap group's commercial song parody of the Roy Orbison rock bal-
lad Oh Pretty Woman may be a fair use within the meaning of the 1976
Copyright Act, the Supreme Court, in the course of its analysis, revised
the matrix of factors to be considered in conducting a fair use evaluation.
Of the revisions set forth in Acuff-Rose, a far-reaching development - on
occasion with paradoxical results - was the Supreme Court's distinction
between parody and satire:
[T]he heart of any parodist's claim to quote from existing mate-
rial, is the use of some elements of a prior author's composition
to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that au-
thor's works. . . . Parody needs to mimic an original to make its
point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim's ...
imagination, whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so
requires justification for the very act of borrowing.27
Thus, in the wake of Acuff-Rose, a photograph commissioned by Par-
amount Pictures to advertise the slapstick comedy movie Naked Gun 33 1/
3 was found to be a fair use parody of an image created by the photogra-
24 960 F.2d at 303.
25 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.
1986); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 838 F.
Supp. 1501 (N.D. Okla. 1993); New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Mu-
sic Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
26 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
27 Id. at 580-81.
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pher Annie Leibovitz: a nude and pregnant Demi Moore which appeared
on the cover of the August 1991 issue of Vanity Fair magazine. 28 The fact
that virtually the only visual difference between the two photographs was
that the later photograph was graced with the head of a smirking Leslie
Nielsen (starring in the motion picture) rather than a serious Demi Moore,
seemed to bother the courts not at all. The Second Circuit, in affirming a
New York federal district court's dismissal of Liebovitz's copyright in-
fringement suit, found that Nielsen's smirk was a comment on the serious-
ness of Liebovitz's work, and did not interfere with any of Liebovitz's
potential markets. 29 On the other hand, in 1997 the Ninth Circuit, in the
earlier referred to Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books,3 0 held that a
book written by Katz and Wrinn entitled The Cat NOT in the Hat! sati-
rizing the O.J. Simpson double-murder trial in rhyming verse, could not
claim a parodic fair use of Dr. Seuss's earlier book, The Cat in the Hat.
Never mind that the third page, for example, in Katz and Wrinn's work
reads, in describing the murder of Simpson's wife Nicole Brown, "One
Knife? / Two Knife? / Red Knife / Dead Wife" evoking the first part of the
first poem in Seuss's book One Fish Two Fish Red Fish Blue Fish: the
Ninth Circuit noted that:
[a]lthough The Cat NOT in the Hat! does broadly mimic Dr.
Seuss['s] characteristic style, it does not hold up his style to
ridicule.31
In addition, the Ninth Circuit found that in view of
[t]he good will and reputation associated with Dr. Seuss['s] work
.... Penguin['s] ... nontransformative and admittedly commer-
cial [use permits the conclusion] that market substitution is at
least more certain and market harm may be more readily
inferred.32
It seems fair to call into question the Ninth Circuit's perception that a
versified recounting of the O.J. Simpson double murder trial would under-
cut the market for the typical reader of Dr. Seuss. It also seems fair to
question the Ninth Circuit's finding that Katz and Wrinn's piece lacked
transformativeness because "the substance and content of The Cat in the
28 For a brief discussion of this incident in the aftermath of Acuff-Rose, see 2
RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR COL-
LECTORS, INVESTORS, DEALERS AND ARTISTS 871 (1998).
29 Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998), affg 948 F.
Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
30 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
31 Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th
Cir. 1997), cert. dismissed, 521 U.S. 1146 (1997).
32 Id. at 1403.
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Hat is not conjured up by the focus on the Brown-Goldman murders or
the O.J. Simpson trial."33
A second, apparently far-reaching, development in Acuff-Rose was
the Supreme Court's reconfiguration of the first fair use factor - the pur-
pose and character of the use. In analyzing this first factor, the Court
stated that the central issue posed is the following: does the new work
merely supersede the original work, or does it contribute something new
with a further purpose or different character - that is, is the new work
transformative?34 The Court further noted that the more transformative
the new work, the less significant are other factors, such as commercialism,
that may militate against a finding of fair use.35 A key question in light of
Acuff-Rose is this: does the transformative requirement in a fair-use de-
fense threaten the historical - and creative - tradition of image
appropriation?
A. Hoepker v. Kruger
Barbara Kruger, a postmodernist noted earlier in this article, was
sued inter alia on a theory of copyright infringement in a New York federal
district court in the recent case of Hoepker v. Kruger36 and escaped liabil-
ity on a copyright technicality. Here, Kruger, a well-know postmodernist,
created in 1990 an untitled collage work, incorporating into this work a
photographic image of plaintiff Charlotte Dabney created in 1960 by a
well-known German photographer, Thomas Hoepker. Hoepker's image,
entitled Charlotte As Seen By Thomas, pictures Dabney from the waist up,
holding a large magnifying glass over her right eye. Dabney's eye fills the
lens of the magnifying glass, and the lens covers a large portion of Dab-
ney's face. The image was published once in 1960 in the German photog-
raphy magazine Foto Prisma. Kruger created her work thirty years later by
cropping and enlarging the Hoepker image, transferring it to silkscreen
and, in keeping with her artistic style, superimposing three large red
blocks containing words that can be read together as, "It's a small world
but not if you have to clean it." The image and the superimposed lettering
comprised the sum and substance of her collage.
In April 1990, Kruger sold her collage to defendant Museum of Con-
temporary Art L.A. (MOCA) and granted MOCA a non-exclusive license
to reproduce the work. From mid-October 1999 through mid-February
2000, MOCA displayed the Kruger work as one of sixty-four works of art
in an exhibition dedicated to Kruger. In conjunction with the exhibition,
33 Id.
34 Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
35 Id.
36 Hoepker v. Kruger, 200 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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MOCA sold gift items in its museum shop in the form of postcards, note
cubes, refrigerator magnets and t-shirts featuring this particular Kruger
work. Additionally, MOCA published jointly with defendant M.I.T Press
a 200-plus page catalog of Kruger's works and ideas entitled Barbara Kru-
ger, containing three separate depictions of the Kruger work in issue.
MOCA's net revenues from sales of the gift items were approximately
$15,000,37 and its net revenues from sales of the catalog were approxi-
mately $54,000.38 MIT Press's net revenues from its sales of the catalog
were approximately $40,000.39 After closing in Los Angeles, the Kruger
exhibit was shown at defendant Whitney Museum of American Art (the
"Whitney") from mid-July 2000 through mid-October 2000. The Whitney
advertised the Kruger exhibit by way of newsletters and brochures incor-
porating the Kruger work, as well as a five-story high billboard of a repro-
duction of the Kruger work in "one or more locations in Manhattan" 40
affixed to sides of buildings. Additionally, the Whitney purchased from
MOCA an inventory of the Kruger catalog and a number of the MOCA
gift items to sell in its museum store in conjunction with the Kruger exhibi-
tion. The Whitney's approximate profits from sales of the Kruger catalog
were less than $37,00041 and profits from its sales of gift items were less
than $800.42 Moreover, a reproduction of the Kruger work appeared from
June 1997 through mid-December 2000 on a now-retired Web site entitled
"American Visions" maintained by defendant Education Broadcasting
System (EBS), use of the image having been licensed by defendant Mary
Boone Gallery, Kruger's agent.43
In granting the dismissal of Hoepker's copyright claim on the defend-
ants' motion for summary judgment, the New York federal district court
noted that both Kruger and MOCA were reliance parties to a restored
copyright. That is, when Hoepker's work was first published in Germany
in 1960, according to the Uniform Copyright Convention, to which both
Germany and the United States are signatories, Hoepker's work was ac-
corded in the United States the same protection as the United States ac-
corded works of domestic nationals first published in the United States. 44
Therefore, Hoepker obtained a copyright in the United States simultane-
ously with his copyright in Germany. The Copyright Act of 1909 (which
governed Hoepker's United States copyright) accorded Hoepker copy-







44 Id. at 344.
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right protection for an initial term of twenty-eight years, subject to re-
newal for another twenty-eight years. When Hoepker failed to renew his
copyright in 1988 (when his initial term, running from 1960 to 1988 ex-
pired), the copyright protection to his work in the United States ended, his
work was injected into the public domain, and Kruger was free to appro-
priate Hoepker's photograph and incorporate it into her own work. Kru-
ger's work was created in 1990. In 1994, the United States' current
Copyright Act was amended to restore copyright protection to a work of
foreign origin still protected in its source country but injected into the pub-
lic domain in the United States for failure to comply with certain formali-
ties of U.S. copyright law.45 Hoepker's work, Charlotte As Seen By
Thomas, qualified as a restored work.4 6 However, the amended Copyright
Act restores copyright only for prospective acts of infringement. 47
Therefore, as the court noted, Hoepker had no cause of action against
Kruger for any acts of infringement occurring between 1988 and 1994.48
As for alleged acts of infringement occurring after the restoration of
Hoepker's copyright, the court noted that Kruger was a reliance party:
that is, (1) by creating her collage in 1990 she clearly would have violated
Hoepker's exclusive right to create a derivative work based on his photo-
graph, had his image been protected by copyright in the United States at
that time, and (2) according to Hoepker's allegations, Kruger continued to
engage in infringing acts after Hoepker's U.S. copyright had been re-
stored. As a reliance party, Kruger may engage in acts which infringe
Hoepker's restored work for a period that ends twelve months after she is
served with formal notice by Hoepker of his intent to enforce his restored
copyright.49 Since Hoepker neither gave Kruger the requisite notice, nor
filed such a notice of intent with the Copyright Office,5 0 the court held
that Hoepker, at this time, was barred from seeking redress for any alleged
acts of infringement by Kruger.
Although, as noted earlier, a technicality in current U.S. copyright law
interposed itself between Kruger's appropriation of Hoepker's photo-
45 See 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2000).
46 When Hoepker's photograph was first published in Germany in 1960, its term
of copyright protection was twenty-five years. The German law was subse-
quently revised to accord a term of protection of life of the author plus
seventy years. See Hoepker, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 345.
47 17 U.S.C. § 104A (d)(1)-(2) (2000).
48 Actually, the effective date of restoration is January 1, 1996, as adopted by the
Copyright Office and by independent issuance by then-President Clinton of
a proclamation adopting that date.
49 17 U.S.C. § 104A (d)(2)(A), (d)(2)(B) (2000).
50 Hoepker, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 345. See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(4) (2000), which
sets forth the requirements for initiating an infringement action against a
reliance party.
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graph and deeds of actionable infringement, such was not the case in an-
other recent controversy, this one involving the professional photographer
Lauren Greenfield and the artist Damian Loeb.
B. Greenfield v. Loeb5
Here, Lauren Greenfield, a young photographer and photojournalist
who has attained a measure of distinction in her field, authored a book
entitled Fast Forward: Growing Up in the Shadow of Hollywood which was
published in 1997 by Alfred Knopf, Inc. The book, which consists of color
photographs and copious text created over a five-year period, addresses
the topic of young people from a variety backgrounds growing up in Los
Angeles and how the youth culture in this geographic area is affected by
Hollywood. The book, when published, as well as Greenfield, received
considerable publicity: the book was reviewed in a number of publications
such as The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Los Angeles
Times, Harvard Magazine and New York Magazine and Greenfield was
interviewed over television and radio on, for example, Good Morning
America, The News Hour with Jim Lehrer and All Things Considered.52
Included in Greenfield's book and featured on the front of the book's
dust jacket is a photograph entitled Mijanou and Friends from Beverly
Hills High School on Senior Beach Day, Will Rogers State Park ("the Pho-
tograph"). The Photograph depicts a number of high school students
dressed in shorts or beachwear seated in or standing around three horizon-
tally parked cars, one in front of another. [see Fig. 1] The car in the fore-
ground is a convertible, affording a clear, open and detailed view of the
three students seated within, one of whom is a full-chested girl in a bikini
top. All of the material in Greenfield's book, including the Photograph, is
protected by copyright and was registered with the U.S. Copyright Office
in 1997.53
In 1998, the defendant Damian Loeb, a well-known appropriation art-
ist living in New York City, created a painting entitled Sunlight Mildness
("the Painting") in a manner typical of much of his other work. That is,
Loeb, as a "photorealist," frequently appropriates images or portions of
images from other sources, such as works of art, advertisements or motion
pictures, and incorporates these images into his own work: depictions of
51 First Amended Complaint, Feb. 20, 2001, Lauren Greenfield v. Damian Loeb,
99 Civ 5836 (LMM). The pleadings and a redacted copy of the settlement
agreement were made available to me with the gracious cooperation of
Gloria C. Phares, Esq., of Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP, attorneys
for Plaintiff.
52 Id. at 4.
53 Id.
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near-photographic accuracy.54 In creating Sunlight Mildness, Loeb appro-
priated a portion of Greenfield's Photograph - that portion depicting the
convertible and three teen-agers in the foreground - and juxtaposed that
image with an image of a South African death squad created by another
photographer and made a painting of the composite. [see Fig. 2] In July
1998, Loeb wrote to Greenfield seeking permission to include her image in
his painting, and within days, Greenfield wrote back to Loeb, expressly
denying him this permission.5 5 Greenfield was unaware at this time that
what was described as a "doctored version" of Sunlight Mildness had ear-
lier appeared on the cover of the May-June 1998 issue of Flash Art, argua-
bly the leading international contemporary art magazine currently in
circulation. That issue of Flash Art also included an article about Damian
Loeb. In 1999, Sunlight Mildness (which included Loeb's appropriation of
Greenfield's image despite her refusal of permission) was exhibited and
sold by the Mary Boone Gallery.
Greenfield sued Loeb, along with other related parties, for willfully
infringing her copyright in the Photograph by reproducing it, preparing a
derivative work of the Photograph, that is, the Painting, publicly display-
ing the Painting and selling it.56 After Greenfield filed her original Com-
plaint, Loeb reproduced and displayed the Painting on his Web site. In
February 2001, Greenfield amended her complaint to add a charge of will-
ful infringement by Loeb of her Photograph in that he reproduced and
displayed the Painting on his Web site.57 At the time, Loeb's Web site
included photographs of Loeb, reproductions of his work, and contact in-
formation about his dealers.5 8 In her suit against Loeb and related parties,
Greenfield sought injunctive relief, actual damages and infringing profits
or statutory damages for the parties' willful acts of infringement, impound-
ment, court costs and attorney's fees, notification to current and all future
owners that the Painting is an infringing work and cannot be lawfully dis-
played, and that the defendants be required to reclaim the Painting and all
existing copies for impoundment, destruction or such other disposition as
Greenfield would elect.59
Greenfield v. Loeb was ultimately settled in November 2001.60 The
settlement agreement included, among other terms: i) payment of a settle-
54 Id. at 5.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 7.
57 Id. at 6-7.
58 Id. at 6.
59 Id. at 8-9.
60 Settlement agreement made as of November 9, 2001 among Lauren Green-
field, Damian Loeb, Manian Lobe, Inc., Mary Boone and the Mary Boone
Gallery.
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ment fee to Greenfield; ii) retitling of the Painting to acknowledge reli-
ance on Greenfield's Photograph;61 and iii) indicating on the back of the
Painting the name of the Photograph on which the Painting is based and
the name of the book in which the Photograph is found.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE TO LITIGATION
There is little reason to anticipate either that the time-honored pro-
cess of artistic creation, including image appropriation, will change in the
foreseeable future or that our current copyright laws will serve as an abso-
lute deterrent to appropriation by artists of images that may still be under
copyright protection. Notwithstanding Damian Loeb in the Greenfield
case described above (and Damian Loeb, at the time he sought the use of
Greenfield's photograph, was represented by an agent62 who may have
advised him), most artists in the process of creating an artwork simply
appropriate the images that suit and address the securing of permissions as
an afterthought. Many never consider permissions. What has evolved in
recent years is i) the pervasive use of Internet technologies and ii) the
duration of United States copyright protection for hundreds of thousands
of images originating in this country - a term of protection affirmed in
January 2003 by the Supreme Court in Eldred,63 reinforcing the additional
twenty-year term of protection for published works under existing copy-
right. These two developments ensure not only that copyrighted images
will continue to be appropriated in abundance but that awareness of the
appropriations will be fostered far and wide. This, in turn, will give rise to
increasing exposure on the part of artists to copyright infringement suits
- a costly, time-consuming and often emotionally wrenching experience
that both parties might seek to avoid if there were another alternative.
That alternative is proposed here in the form of a "Fine Art License."
(See Appendix A)
A. What is a "Fine Art License"?
A Fine Art License would apply only to a work of art created and
published in the United States and under copyright protection at the time
of its appropriation ("Protected Work"). It would be a license to incorpo-
rate the Protected Work either in full or in a "recognizable amount" into a
subsequent work of fine art. This subsequent work must be either a single
piece of fine art such as a painting, sculpture, photograph, or drawing, or a
61 In a conversation on December 18, 2002, Gloria Phares advised this author
that the Painting has physically been retitled to accord Greenfield credit in
the Painting's new title.
62 The agent referred to in this context was not the Mary Boone Gallery.
63 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003).
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signed and numbered, limited edition fine print or sculpture multiple that
shall in no event exceed 500 in the edition ("Subsequent Work"). The
Fine Art License would include the right to incorporate the image of the
Protected Work into the Subsequent Work, publicly display the Subse-
quent Work, advertise and promote the Subsequent Work in all media and
sell (or lease) the Subsequent Work. The Fine Art License would be is-
sued by the clearing-house administering such a license, upon payment to
the clearing-house of a Fine Art License Fee as herein described.
The Fine Art License Fee would be a revenue-based fee, subject to a
three-tier floor as follows: the lowest floor, perhaps $1,000, would apply to
a Subsequent Work that is or will be a single work of fine art; a higher
floor, perhaps $5,000, would apply to a Subsequent Work that is or will be
a signed and numbered fine art multiple in a limited edition not to exceed
100. The highest floor, perhaps $10,000, would apply to a Subsequent
Work that is or will be a signed and numbered fine art multiple in a limited
edition exceeding 100 but in no event exceeding 500. Once revenue gener-
ated by the sale, lease or other commercial use of the Subsequent Work
has met the applicable floor (and this minimum sum must be paid by the
author of the Subsequent Work ("Licensee") to the author of the Pro-
tected Work through the clearing-house before any use can be made of the
Subsequent Work), then the author of the Protected Work will receive
payment in the amount of 8%64 of any overage - either as a lump sum, or
in the form of a royalty, depending on the nature of both the Subsequent
Work and the transaction in question. For example, if the Subsequent
Work is a single painting, the Fine Art License would trigger an immediate
payment to the author of the Protected Work in the amount of $1,000. If
the Subsequent Work then sells for $100,000, the author of the Protected
Work would receive an additional $7,920: that is, 8% of $99,000, for an
eventual total Fine Art License Fee of $8,920. To take another example, if
the Subsequent Work is a limited-edition sculpture multiple in an edition
of three, the Fine Art License would trigger an immediate payment to the
author of the Protected Work of $5,000. If all three works in the limited
edition were to sell for a total of, say, $367,000 (as in the case of Rogers v.
Koons), then the Fine Art License would cause Art Rogers (to extend the
hypothetical) to realize additional monies in the amount of $28,960 - that
is, 8% of $362,000, for a total Fine Art License Fee of $33,960. Of course,
if a Subsequent Work fails to generate any revenue, then the Fine Art
License Fee to the author of the Protected Work is the applicable floor
fee.
64 Royalty rate is based on information derived from G.J. Battersby & C.W.
Grimes, Licensing Royalty Rates (2000), an excellent treatise on the subject.
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In addition to the payment of monies to the author of a Protected
Work, the Fine Art License includes an option to accord credit to the au-
thor of the Protected Work, as discussed below. The Fine Art License
would include a waiver of any right by the Licensee to make any deriva-
tive works based on the Subsequent Work. It would also include a waiver
of any right by the Licensee to sue for copyright infringement of the Sub-
sequent Work, such right to belong solely to the author of the Protected
Work. The Fine Art License includes solely the right to incorporate the
image of a Protected Work into the Subsequent Work, and the exploita-
tion of the Subsequent Work within the parameters noted above: the Sub-
sequent Work expressly excludes, by definition, any item of
"merchandise" including posters, note cards, tee shirts, and the like. Any
use of a Protected Work on any items of merchandise, or for any other
commercial purpose would require, as is currently the case, the negotia-
tion and procurement of a license from the copyright proprietor of the
Protected Work, or the copyright proprietor's agent.
1. Works Qualifying for a Fine Art License
In order for a prospective appropriated work to qualify as the subject
of a Fine Art License, it must be i) a Protected Work, that is, a work
originating and published in the United States and under copyright protec-
tion in the United States at the time of the appropriation, and ii) regis-
tered with the U.S. Copyright Office. Since the copyright registration of
an image is a public record, an artist interested in appropriating such an
image for incorporation into a Subsequent Work can readily ascertain if
that image would be eligible for a Fine Art License. While registration of
an image with the U.S. Copyright Office would constitute permission for
use of the image solely in a Subsequent Work upon payment to the artist
clearing-house (which would forward payment, net of a service charge, on
to the copyright proprietor) for a Fine Art License, all other rights in a
work accruing to the copyright proprietor upon copyright registration, in-
cluding initiating a copyright infringement action for use other than in a
Subsequent Work, are preserved.
2. Administration of the Fine Art License
The Fine Art License would be administered through an artist's copy-
right clearing-house such as, for example, the Artists Rights Society
(ARS), an organization that represents many prominent twentieth century
artists and artist estates such as Jackson Pollock, Marc Chagall, Pablo Pi-
casso, Mark Rothko, and Georgia O'Keeffe in negotiating and granting
permissions to those desirous of reproducing artworks of such artists in
printed and electronic media as well as on various products. However,
unlike the current practice at ARS - which is an appointed representa-
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tive of the respective member artists and artist estates - the copyright
clearing-house that administers the Fine Art License will automatically re-
present each copyright proprietor of a Protected Work in connection with
anyone desirous of incorporating that Protected Work into a Subsequent
Work.
When a prospective Licensee wishes to use a Protected Work in a
Subsequent Work, the Licensee will send the appropriate Fine Art License
Fee floor amount (that is, $1,000, $5,000 or $10,000) to the copyright clear-
ing-house in question, along with a form (which could be made available
online at the clearing house's Web site) indicating the title of the Protected
Work, the copyright proprietor (usually the artist) of the Protected Work,
the author of the Protected Work (if different from the copyright proprie-
tor), the prospective title of the Subsequent Work, whether the Subse-
quent Work will be a single work or a signed and numbered limited
edition, and, if the latter, the prospective edition size. In addition to the
Fine Art License Fee floor amount and the copyright clearinghouse form,
the prospective Licensee will forward to the clearing-house two (2) color
photographs of the Subsequent Work. If the copyright proprietor and au-
thor of the Protected Work are different parties (which will not usually be
the case), then the prospective Licensee will forward three (3) photo-
graphs to the clearing-house. The clearing-house will deduct a small ser-
vice charge and remit the balance of the Fine Art License Fee floor
amount, along with the Fine Art License and one of the photographs to
the copyright proprietor. The Fine Art License includes an opt-out provi-
sion notifying the copyright proprietor of the Protected Work that she will
receive a credit in the title of the Subsequent Work and in all advertising
and promotion of the Subsequent Work unless the copyright proprietor
indicates a refusal to be associated with the Subsequent Work by checking
off a box on the Fine Art License and returning it to the clearing-house
within one week following the copyright proprietor's receipt of the form.
In the event the author of the Protected Work and the copyright proprie-
tor of the Protected Work are different parties, then each of the two par-
ties receives a copy of the Fine Art License and a photograph of the
Subsequent Work, the copyright proprietor receives the Fine Art License
Fee floor amount, and the author has the right to fill out the opt-out provi-
sion and return the Fine Art License to the copyright clearing-house.
Where revenue generated by a Subsequent Work exceeds the Fine
Art License Fee floor amount paid to the copyright proprietor of the Pro-
tected Work, it will be up to the Licensee to make the applicable payments
to the copyright proprietor of the Protected Work, through the clearing-
house. The clearing-house will have the right to examine periodically the
Licensee's (and Licensee's agent's) relevant books and records to ensure
compliance in payment of the full Fine Art License Fee. Evidence of
fraud or other malfeasance on the part of the Licensee in evading payment
of the full Fine Art License Fee could result in the imposition of monetary
sanctions, such as, for example, payment of triple the amount found to be
due and owing to the copyright proprietor of the Protected Work.
3. Rights and Remedies
If the creator of a Subsequent Work incorporating at least a "recog-
nizable amount" 65 of a Protected Work, publicly displays, disseminates or
reproduces the Subsequent Work without securing a Fine Art License, the
copyright proprietor of the Protected Work should automatically be enti-
tled to sue either for enhanced statutory damages or actual damages that
factor in the willful failure to secure a Fine Art License, and there should
be a rebuttable presumption that the copyright proprietor of the Protected
Work will prevail.
B. Benefits of a Fine Art License
It seems clear that reconfiguring the scope of fair use to accommodate
the issuance of compulsory Fine Art Licenses for the creation and ex-
ploitation of art works as described in this article would work to the bene-
fit of all concerned.
1. From a Societal Perspective
The fundamental principle animating United States copyright law, un-
like that of nations whose jurisprudence is grounded in civil law,66 is the
provision of financial inducement to artists, authors and composers to cre-
ate works for the ultimate benefit of society. A Fine Art License is in
consonance with U.S. copyright law objectives: that is, it will permit, for
society's ultimate benefit, the lawful creation of a number of artworks that
otherwise would be enjoined and impounded. The existence of more art
not only creates an enriched artistic heritage serving to engage and edu-
cate the public, but provides, as well, an enhanced body of work to serve
as a source of study and inspiration for future artists.
65 If necessary, this could be determined by arbitration.
66 In civil law countries as well as under the Berne Convention, the core rationale
for copyright law is the protection of the author's rights. See Preamble of
the Berne Convention ("The countries of the Union, being equally
animated by the desire to protect, in as effective and uniform a manner as
possible, the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works . . . have
agreed as follows .... "). For an excellent discussion of certain differences in
the core principles underlying U.S. copyright law and the copyright laws of
civil law nations, see Robert J. Sherman, The Visual Artists Right Act of
1990: American Artists Burned Again, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 373 (1995).
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2. From the Perspective of the Author of the Protected Work
A Fine Art License would inure to the benefit of the author of the
Protected Work by ensuring that such an artist would be both paid a rea-
sonable, revenue-based license fee for a limited commercial use of the art-
ist's Protected Work and receive, if the artist so desires, credit in the title
of the Subsequent Work. This would appear to be far more advantageous
to the artist than the consequences of such an appropriation under the
scenarios possible under our current legal construct: that is, i) the Pro-
tected Work of an artist is appropriated for commercial use, the artist
never discovers the appropriation, and consequently receives nothing
while the appropriator is enriched; ii) the Protected Work of an artist is
appropriated for commercial use, the artist discovers the appropriation,
sues the appropriator for copyright infringement, the appropriator con-
vinces the finder of fact that the Subsequent Work is a fair use parody or
some other fair use, and consequently is enriched while the artist of the
Protected Work receives nothing and may well have incurred sizable legal
expenses to boot; or iii) in the best-case scenario, the Protected Work of
an artist is appropriated for commercial use, the artist discovers the appro-
priation, initiates an infringement suit and either prevails or the appropria-
tor agrees to a settlement. In this last scenario, the artist will receive
(actual or statuary) damages and injunctive relief. However, this result
will be achieved only after a considerable expenditure of time and money.
Were the Fine Art License a reality at the time of Greenfield v. Loeb, for
example, Ms. Greenfield would have received payment of a license fee
and credit, if she so wished, on the Subsequent Work as the author of the
Protected Work. That is, she would have automatically have been in a
position similar to that she achieved through settlement - minus the ex-
penditure of time and money. And if the Fine Art License fee payable to
Ms. Greenfield (under this construct, $1,000 plus 8% of the purchase price
of the Subsequent Work minus the floor) is not as sizable a sum as was the
negotiated settlement - and, depending on the settlement sum, perhaps it
is - the disparity is more than offset by the monies saved by her in court
costs and attorneys' fees.
Moreover, and in keeping with the spirit of U.S. copyright law,67 if
the author of the Protected Work, upon viewing a photograph of the Sub-
sequent Work, elects not to be associated with it, the author need only sign
and return the opt-out provision to the Fine Art License clearinghouse.
It should be stressed that the author of a Protected Work retains all
other rights in and to his or her work, including the right to sue for any
infringements or use of such a work that lie beyond the scope of the Fine
Art License.
67 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).
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3. From the Perspective of the Author of the Subsequent Work
The Fine Art License provides the author of a Subsequent Work with
the right, upon payment of a reasonable license fee, to appropriate mate-
rial from a Protected Work for incorporation into his or her Subsequent
Work for purposes of commercial exploitation without fear of incurring
legal liability in the form of a copyright infringement suit. Payment of the
Fine Art License will be more than offset by the costs avoided in defend-
ing such a suit. Moreover, net solely of the 8% over floor payable to the
author of the Protected Work, the Licensee is entitled to keep all profits
arising from the sale or lease of such a work.
IV. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND FIRST AMENDMENT
CONSIDERATIONS
Admittedly, implementation of a Fine Art License for commercial use
of a Subsequent Work would tend to narrow the scope of the fair use de-
fense as it now exists. For one, it does away with the distinction between
parody and satire. However, as illustrated earlier in this article, the ratio-
nale for such a distinction is not always clear and the results are not neces-
sarily logical. For another, it chips away at the concept of
"transformativeness" in connection with commercial use. That is, pro-
vided that a "recognizable likeness" of an Original Work is incorporated
into a Subsequent Work for commercial purposes, it matters little whether
the Subsequent Work is slightly or largely transformative: a Fine Art Li-
cense should be secured. Of course, for all non-commercial use of a Sub-
sequent Work, that is, reportage, archival use, research, teaching and the
like, a Fine Art License would not apply, and current fair use principles
would remain intact. Moreover, for all uses of a Subsequent Work beyond
the scope of a Fine Art License, the defense of fair use and the matrix of
factors currently comprising such a defense, would remain available for
assertion by the creator or exploiter of the Subsequent Work. Similarly,
and under the same circumstances, the right by the copyright proprietor of
the Protected Work to instigate an action in copyright infringement would
be preserved. To clarify this last point: if a third party appropriates mate-
rial from the Subsequent Work that had originally appeared in the Pro-
tected Work, the copyright proprietor of the Protected Work - not the
creator of the Subsequent Work - may sue for copyright infringement
and, if successful, retain all monetary awards. On the other hand, if a third
party appropriates only material from the Subsequent Work that had orig-
inally appeared in the Subsequent Work, such an appropriation is not ac-
tionable, as the creator of the Subsequent Work cannot register such a
work with the U.S. Copyright Office. A final point in closing: the imple-
mentation of a Fine Art License should not act as a disincentive to artists
to create works of visual art. The artist of a Protected Work is assured, for
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a limited use of the artist's work, a license fee that, at minimum, falls
within the range of statutory damages codified in the current U. S. Copy-
right Act. 68 Such an artist is also assured, at the artist's election, credit in
connection with any resultant Subsequent Work. By the same token, upon
payment of a reasonable license fee, the artist of a Subsequent Work, in
the course of creating such a work, may appropriate images or portions of
images, as she deems artistically necessary, from a Protected Work, stand
to gain a financial benefit from the sale or other dissemination of such a
work, and to do so without the fear, cost or burden of an infringement suit.
68 Id. § 504(c)(1).
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FIGURES 1 AND 2
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FINE ART LICENSE DRAFT FORM Date:_ APPENDIX A
I. PLEASE PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION
* Title of Protected Work:
* Copyright registration number of Protected Work:
* Copyright Proprietor of Protected Work
* Author of Protected Work (if different from directly above)
* Prospective title of your Work:
* Your Work shall be (check one):
_ a single piece of fine art (e.g., painting, sculpture, drawing, photograph)
_ a signed and numbered limited edition fine print or sculpture multiple of 100 or few
_ same as directly above in an edition size of 500 or fewer (but over 100)
II. TERMS AND CONDITIONS:
1. The Fine Art License Fee includes:
(a) a "Floor Amount" of
(i) $1,000 if your Work is to be a single piece of fine art;
(ii) $5,000 if your Work is to be a signed and numbered limited edition fine print or
sculpture multiple or 100 or fewer; or
(iii) $10,000 if your Work is to be a signed and numbered limited edition fine print or
sculpture multiple of 500 or fewer but over 100; plus
(b) Eight (8%) Percent of all revenues, if any, earned on the sale or lease of your Work, in
excess of your recoupment of the Floor Amount ("Overage").
2. By forwarding this document to ARS along with payment to ARS of the applicable Floor
Amount, you are hereby granted the right to (i) incorporate the Protected Work, in whole or
in part, into your Work; (ii) publicly display your Work; (iii) advertise and promote your
Work in all media; and (iv) sell or lease your Work. Your expression of your Work is hereby
limited to one of the three (3) categories set forth in Paragraph 1(a) above. All rights in and
to, and all uses of, the Protected Work not granted to you in this document are, as between
you and the copyright proprietor, reserved to the copyright proprietor.
3. You hereby waive the right and to agree not to: (i) create any derivative works based on your
Work; and (ii) initiate any lawsuit for copyright infringement of your Work, it being
understood that such right vests solely in the copyright proprietor of the Protected Work.
4. You hereby agree to make timely payment(s) and applicable payments of any Overage
through ARS to the copyright proprietor of the Protected Work. ARS or its agent may
examine all portions of your books and records from time to time and at various times that
relate to the sale or lease of your Work, in order to ensure your compliance with this Fine Art
License. Failure by you to pay the full Fine Art License Fee shall result in liquidated
damages of triple the amount found to be due and owing to the copyright proprietor of the
Protected Work, plus all costs and expenses of the audit.
5. You agree to accord credit by name to the author of the Protected Work in the title of your
Work (such as for example, "[Title of your Work], based on a painting by [name of author of
the protected Work]," unless such author has elected not to receive such credit by checking
the space provided in Paragraph 6 below.
6. By placing a check in the following space_ I elect not to receive credit in connection with
your Work.
ACCEPTED AND AGREED TO:
Your signature Print your name and address and phone number Author of Protected Work

